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NEGLIGENCE and PROXIMATE CAUSE
Some Elementary Observations
There has been noted among students, and even among
members of the bar, a lack of lucidity in the expression of
the principles of law applicable to liability for negligence.
Sometimes the statements of the courts themselves have
been confusing, contradictory and ill-considered and have
thus been readily misunderstood, misused and misinterpreted.
Much has been written about negligence and legal
cause,1 especially the latter. Criticisms of the rules used
to establish negligence and to determine legal cause have
been frequent, and perhaps well warranted. 2 Attempts,
'See, especially, articles in 25 H. L. R. 103, 223, 303 (Jeremiah Smith); 9 Col. L. R. 16, 136 (Joseph W. Bingham); 40 Am.
L. Reg. (n. s.) 80, and 41 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 141 (Professor
Bohlen); Beven on Negligence (3rd Ed.); 1 Street, Foundations
of Legal Liability.
225 H. L. R. 103, 223, 303; 40 Am. L. Reg. (n. s.) 80; see,
e. g., Professor Beale, in 9 H. L. R. 80, "Four or five rules have
been proposed, discussed, and found inadequate; all of them, in
difficult cases, fail even to guide a jury, and no one has prevailed
over the others." See also Goode, J., in Lawrence vs. Heidbreder
Ice Co., 119 Mo. App. 316, 330 (1906), "Several rules of liability have been prescribed, only to be shattered by novel accidents, thus demonstrating that the mind is unable to conjecture
all the harmful results which may flow from a delinquent act and
flow from it in such natural sequence that, on a presented case, it
can be pronounced the wrongdoer was to blame."
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varying in the degree of success attained thereby, have

been made to formulate simpler and more comprehensive
rules. 3 On the ground that no rule is better than a poor
one, it has been urged4 that all the rules used in determining legal cause be "scrapped," and each case be decided by
the jury without the aid of allegedly meaningless definitions. 5
But the courts always have used, and will continue to
use, some principles by which may be solved the vexatious
problems of negligence and legal cause. Perhaps, then, it
would not be a wasted effort to offer a succinct and concise
recapitulation of these principles, which may serve as an
elaboration of the statements found in the usual text book,
as a digest of the treatment accorded by treatises and encyclopedias, and as an introduction or stepping stone to
the lengthy discussions of critics, constructive and destructive.
It -must be remembered that in the beginnings of our
system of law there was no negligence. The writ of trespass provided the only action ex delicto. If a defendant
set in motion some force which, before it came to rest, injured the plaintiff or his property, the latter could recover
damages in trespass. A man was absolutely liable for all
the immediate consequences of the direct application of
force to the person or property of another, and that without regard to the degree of care used, inevitable accident,
or the lawfulness of the act.8
Gradually this absolute liability was lessened by the
discovery that the degree of care used by the defendant was
important. It then came to be settled law that a defendant
was liable in trespass, i. e. for the immediate consequences
325 H. L. R. 303, 309; 9 Col. L. R. 16, 136.

Am. L. Rev. 518-519.
See note 34, infra.
6Weaver vs. Ward, Hobart (Eng.), 134 (1616). It was not
finally settled in England until 1891 that if defendant was free
from negligence or fault he was not liable. See Stanley vs.
Powell, (1891) L. R. 1 Q. B. (Eng.) 86 (1891).
48
5
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of some act of force, only if he had a wrongful intent or if
he was at fault. The defendant had a wrongful intent if
the act which he intended to do was unlawful or wrongful. T
If the act which he intended to do was lawful, then he was
liable for its immediate consequences only if he was negligent in doing the act.8
Until the introduction of the form of action known as
trespass on the case, there was no liability for consequential or indirect injurious results. Later, in this form of action, a defendant was held liable if he did a lawful act negligently and indirect or consequential harm to the plaintiff
resulted therefrom. Because it was involved more frequently and more prominently in actions on the case than
in actions in trespass, negligence came to be treated as a
distinct ground of liability as a distinct tort in itself. In
reality, it was an ingredient or element of liability in both
trespass and trespass on the case, the form of action to be
properly employed depending on whether the harmful resuits were direct and immediate, or indirect and consequential.
To make out a prima facie cause of action against a defendant on the ground of negligence (whatever the form
of the action), it is submitted that the plaintiff must produce
evidence sufficient to permit the following questions to be
7If A is wrongfully beating B's dog, and, as he raise's the
stick, unintentionally hits C in the eye, he is liable to C. The act
which A intended to do, namely, hit the dog, was wrongful; therefore, he intended a wrongful act (though not the specific harm
which followed), and in the eyes of the law, had a wrongful intent. See, e. g., Peterson vs. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130 (1877); Corning vs. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97 (1851); Carmichael vs. Dolen, 25
Nebr. 335 (1899),
sBrown vs. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850), where defendant
while beating two fighting dogs in an attempt to separate them, a
lawful act, struck the plaintiff in the eye with a stick. The court
held that since defendant was not doing an unlawful act he had
no wrongful intent, and could only be liable for doing a lawful
act if he did it negligently. See, in accord, Morris vs. Platt, 32
Conn. 75 (1864); Brown vs. Collins, 53 N. H. 442 (1873).
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answered in the affirmative: (1) was the defendant "negligent?" (2) did the plaintiff suffer damage for which the
law will give redress? and (3) was the defendant's negligence the "legal" or "proximate '" cause of the plaintiff's
injury? This is simply applying to cases of negligence the
three elements of liability in any tort action, viz., defendant's wrongdoing, plaintiff's legal harm and the connection
of the two by legal cause. It is purposed only to deal with
the principles which govern the establishment of the first
and third elements, assuming that the plaintiff has suffered
legal harm.
The first question in determining the defendants liability is "Was the defendant negligent?" A defendant is
liable in a tort action if he has invaded a right or rights of
the plaintiff, or in other words, if he has failed to perform
the correlative duty which he owed the plaintiff. Everyone has certain "legal" rights, and everyone else is under
correlative duties not to invade those rights. So in ascertaining a defendant s liability for negligence, it must be
found that plaintiff's rights have been invaded and that
defendant has not performed the correlative duty imposed
by law upon him. To the laiety, negligence means a failure
to use care. 1° Thus a defendant is legally negligent only
when the plaintiff had a legal right to care and caution on
the part of the defendant and the latter has violated that
right to care and caution on the part of the defendant and
the latter has violated that right to the plaintiff's damage,
or in other words, only when the defendant has failed to
perform the duty of care which he owed to the plaintiff.
Briefly then, legal negligence is the violation by a defendant
O"Proximate" is generally used as a synonym of "legal.' The
term "proximate cause" is literally a misnomer, because proximate means nearest, and nearness in time or space is not an exclusive test in determining legal cause. See 1 Street, Foundations
of Legal Liability, p. 122.
lONegligence is lack of due diligence or care,--Webster's Dictionary (1920 Ed.), p. 1446.
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of the duty to use care which he owes to the plaintiff. Such
expressions as "until the duty to use care arises, a man may
be as negligent as he pleases ' " are confusing. This may be
so in a lay sense, but not in a legal sense. A man cannot
be legally negligent unless he violates a duty. Therefore,
until the duty arises, he cannot be negligent.
This leads us to another question: "When is the defendant under a duty to use care?" Assume that plaintiff is
about to cross a crowded street and that defendant is driving an automobile along the same street. Manifestly the
plaintiff has the legal right to cross the street without having his arm broken. The defendant also has the legal right
to drive the automobile along the street, operating it with
one hand and gazing at store windows, if he sees fit. If
plaintiff is struck and his arm broken, although both were
exercising legal rights, the scales of justice tip in favor of
the plaintiff, because defendant ought to have known that,
if he drove thus, he would be likely to hit persons crossing
the street, a class of persons to which plaintiff belonged.
As between the parties, it is just that defendant should suffer, inasmuch as he failed to take steps to avert foreseeable harm. Further, if defendant foresaw in the exercise
of his right danger to another, then defendant should use
care in the exercise of his right to prevent invasion of the
rights of the other. To do so then is his legal duty.
To insure, in some measure, uniformity of decisions on
similar facts, the defendant should be held to that degree
of care which an ordinary man of reasonable prudence
would use in averting the danger which the ordinary man
would foresee.12 The plaintiff should be permitted to feel
IIE. g., see LelAevre vs. Gould, L. R. (1898) 1 Q. B. (Eng.)
491.

12"Instead of saying that the liability for negligence should
be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which
would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual,

we ought to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe." Tindal, C. J., in Vaughan vs. Menlove, 3 Bingham's New
Cases (Eng.), 468 (1837).
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that all persons in their conduct will foresee the dangers to
him that an ordinary man would foresee and will use toward him to avert those dangers the care of an ordinary
man. The plaintiff should not be restricted in the exercise
of his rights by the knowledge or fear that each person is
bound only to use his own individual judgment and intelligence in foreseeing danger to the plaintiff and in taking
care to avoid it.
This, then, brings us to a statement of the principle
used in determining when the duty to use care arises. It
is well stated in an English case,' in substance, thus: Whenever the defendant is by circumstances so placed with regard to the person or property of a determinate person or
of a determinate class of persons, that an ordinary, prudent man would foresee, that, unless he used ordinary, reasonable care in his own conduct under those circumstances,
he would cause injury to such other person or to members
of such class of persons, a duty on the part of the defendant
arises to use the ordinary, reasonable care which such a
man of ordinary prudence would have used to avoid such
danger."1 The violation of this duty to use care is negliIn this connection, is it not curious that the law should compel a man to pay damages for failing to use his mental powers in
foreseeing harm and in determining due care, and, if his mental
powers are inferior, mulct him in damages because he hasn't done
what the brain of an ordinary man would dictate? An answer to
this is that as between the parties, plaintiff, at least, should not
suffer.3
, Heaven vs. Pender, L. R. (1883) 11 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 503.
"4See similar language in Hydraulic Works vs. Orr, 83 Pa.
332 (1877); Kay vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 65 Pa. 269 (1870); Wittenberg vs. Seitz, 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 439.
Negligence is the absence of care according to the circumstances, and must be measured by the apparent danger." Ellis
vs. Railroad Co., 138 Pa. 506, 519 (1890).
In this connection, it is important to distinguish between
legal duty and moral duty. There is a legal duty to use care toward plaintiff, when defendant should reasonably have foreseen
in his conduct danger to plaintiff, unless reasonable care was used
in that conduct. Defendant owes plaintiff only a moral duty (and
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gence. To state the principle in other words: if under all
the circumstances surrounding the defendant, a man of ordinary prudence would have foreseen harm to the plaintiff
or to a class of persons to which plaintiff belonged, then defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff to use the care of a
man of ordinary prudence to avert such harm. It is seen,
then, that the criterion by which negligence (the breach
of the duty to the plaintiff to use care) is generally established is the foreseeability of harm of some kind to the person or property of the plaintiff or of a class of persons of
which the plaintiff is a member.' s
is not liable for its non-performance), when he foresees danger
to plaintiff from the conduct of a third person, or where plaintiff
has been endangered by defendant's non-culpable conduct, i. e.,
reasonably careful conduct. See Buch vs. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.
H. 257 (1897); Union Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Cappier, 66 Kans. 649
(1903); Ollet vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 201 Pa. 361 (1902). If defendant
elects to perform his moral duty to plaintiff, he is liable if he fails
to use due care in so doing, for he can reasonably foresee danger
in his own conduct, unless he uses due care. See King vs. R. R.
Co., 23 R. I. 583 (1902); Dyche vs. R. R. Co., 79 Miss. 361
(1901).
IsIt must appear that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care,
1. e., there was a reasonable foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff
or a class of persons to which plaintiff belongs. "Even if the defendant owes a duty of care to some one else, but does not owe it
to the person injured, no action will lie. The duty must be due

to the person injured." Mitchell, C. J., in Akers vs. Chicago, etc.,
R. R. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 544 (1894), and see Morris vs. Brown,
111 N. Y. 318, 326 (1888). The duty to use care toward a class
of persons of which plaintiff is a member may be imposed by statute or municipal ordinance. Non-compliance with the statute or
ordinance is usually held to be negligence per se.

Bott vs. Pratt,

33 Minn. 323 (1885); U. S. Brewing Co. vs. Stottenberg, 211 Ill.
531 (1904); but in the following cases it was held that the violation of an ordinance of such a character is only admissible with
other facts as evidence tending to prove negligence; Knupfle vs.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488 (1881); P. & R. R. Co. vs.
Ervin, 89 Pa. 71 (1879); Lederman vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 165 Pa.
118 (1895); Ubelman vs. American Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398 (1904);
Riegert vs. Thackery, 212 Pa. 86 (1905). Violation of a state
statute imposing a duty of care toward a class of persons of
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It may be argued that, although negligence is the violation of the duty to use care and the principle just stated
determines when the duty to use care arises, there is still
vagueness, inasmuch as questions arise as to what constitutes a man of ordinary prudence and what harms would
he foresee and what would he do under like circumstances.
In using this standard to judge the conduct of the defendant, as negligent or non-negligent, the question of negligence is usually one for the jury. It is, and must be, assumed that the twelve jurors, believing themselves to be
men of ordinary prudence, will exercise their judgment as
such in any unanimous answer to the above mentioned inquiries. 16 It may then be urged that the standard becomes
indefinite and variable. But variableness and indefiniteness due to differences in judgment of jurymen is a necessary evil to which all juridical determinations of disputed
fact are subject.
As seen above, there are two questions in the establishing of negligence; would a man of ordinary prudence have
foreseen harm to the plaintiff, and, has the defendant failed
to use the care of a man of ordinary prudence to avert the
harm. In a great many cases, however, it is unnecessary
for the jury to ascertain whether under all the circumstances
a man of ordinary prudence would have foreseen harm to
the plaintiff and thus find that the defendant owed him a
duty of care. In such cases the foreseeability of harm is admitted, or so apparent, or identical circumstances and sitwhich plaintiff is a member is negligence per se. Marino vs. Lehmaler, 113 N. Y. 530 (1903); Westervelt vs. Dives, 231 Pa. 548

(1911).
If defendant owed plaintiff no duty of care, he is not liable.
See Landell vs. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406 (1919); Moore vs. Lancaster, 212 Pa. 642 (1915).
16Although the jurors will usually judge defendant's conduct
by what they would have foreseen and done, it would be improper
to instruct them that they might do so. The court should submit
to them the standard of the man of ordinary prudence. See
Louisville & N. R. R. Co. vs. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465.
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uations have arisen so often, the jury each time finding
foreseeability of harm by a man of ordinary prudence, that
the court will say as a matter of law that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Illustrative are the
principles that an occupant of land usually owes no duty of
care to trespassers,' 7 but does owe a duty of care to an invitee I and to persons outside the !anl" to have the premises in a safe condition; the duties on the part of lessors
and lessees of real property to use care in the maintenance
of the premises toward each other and third persons; 20 the
duty of care owed by a manufacturer, vendor or lender of
chattels to those not in privity of contract with them ;21 and
the duty of care owed by bailees to their bailors. 22 In all
these cases, simply upon showing whether or not certain
facts or relationships existed, the court can state as a matter

of law whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of
care. Then the jury must determine whether the duty has
been violated, i. e., whether the defendant has used the
care a man of ordinary prudence would have used under
like circumstances. The determination of negligence in
such cases is a mixed question of law and fact.
Again, the court in a given case may, as a matter of
law, find that the defendant owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff, *as above, and also by a standard fixed by law in
17E. g., see Mager vs. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387 (1906); P.
& R. R. Co. vs. Spearen, 47 Pa. 300 (1864); Thompson vs. R. R.,
218 Pa. 444 (1907); Walsh vs. Railroad, 145 N. Y. 301 (1895);
Terletski vs. P. & R. R. Co., 264 Pa. 35 (1919).
2ADavis vs. Ferris, 53 N. Y. Supp. 571 (1898); Reid vs.
Linck, 206 Pa. 109 (1903); Larmore vs. Crown Point Iron Co.,
101 N. Y. 391 (1886); Newingham vs. Blair Co., 232 Pa. 511
(1911).
IOMintzer vs. Hogg, 192 Pa. 137 (1899).
20
See 24 Cyc., 1114, et seq.
2lThomas vs. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852); Elkins vs.
McKean, 79 Pa. 493 (1875); see cases cited in 29 Cyc., 479, et
seq.
22Bailments, 6 Corpus Juris, 1118.
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previous like cases determine whether the defendant's conduct amounted to performance of the duty to use care. 23 In
such cases, the only real function of the jury is to ascertain
the true facts and circumstances, if they are in dispute. The
establishing of negligence on those facts is a question of
law.
Whether the establishing of negligence is a question of
fact, or of law, or of both law and fact, the ultimate criterion is the foreseeability of harm in the abstract to the plaintiff; If this appears as a matter of law or fact, there is a
duty to use due care, the violation of which is negligence,
whether the defendant's "violating" conduct be compared
with and judged by a standard fixed by law or the standard
of the man of ordinary prudence.
Having thus determined defendant's negligence, and assuming that plaintiff suffered legal harm, but one question
remains. Was the defendant's negligence the legal or proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury? Logicians say that the
cause of a given event (the plaintiff's injury) is the sum of
all its antecedents,24 or in other words, that no one antecedent can be singled out as the cause. Laymen may say that
a given event has many antecedent causes, or that a given
cause may have many subsequent results. But it is the
problem of the law to determine whether the negligence of
the defendant (or other wrongdoing on his part) is predominating, substantial or effective enough as a cause to be
the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.
To determine the existence of legal causal relation and
to define legal cause, many tests and rules have been used.
Some of them cannot be universally applied satisfactorily.
23"There are cases in which a court can determine that omissions constitute negligence; but, they are exceptional-those in
which the precise measure is determinate, the same under all circumstances. When the duty is defined, a failure to perform it is,
of course, negligence and may be so declared by the court:
Schum vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 107 Pa. 8, and cases there cited."
R. R. Co. vs. Coon, 111 Pa. 430, 440 (1886).
24Mill, Logic, (9th Eng. Ed.), 378-383.

Pa.
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Others do not purport to cover all cases. Others do not
guarantee justice in all cases. Some of these tests have
been rejected by the courts, others destroyed by writers.
But the courts continue to use some test, however imperfect
it may be. It is therefore interesting and instructive to note
briefly the tests which have been used and rejected, those
now in accepted use, and those formulated and proposed by
able writers.
The test or rule of legal cause which is most frequently
quoted is "Lord Bacon's maxim," which, with his accom-

panying comment, says: "In iure non remota causa, sed
proxima, spectatur." "It were infinite for the law to judge
the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another;
therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause; and
judgeth acts by that, without looking to any further degree."25 If taken literally, the maxim is incorrect, for the
proximate, in the sense of nearness, is not necessarily the
legal cause. Neither contiguity in space nor nearness in
time is a legal test of causal relation. The cause nearest in
time or space to plaintiff's injury is not necessarily the legal
cause thereof. In the true interpretation of the maxim,
however, "proximate" has a different meaning. It is used
as a synonym of "most efficient producing cause,"26 or
"most predominating cause" in defining legal cause. We
have substituted for "legal cause" another term which is
just as needful of explanation. Bacon's maxim has been
severely criticized and rejected. 27 Certainly it does not
convey any very clear idea of legal cause.
25Bacon's Maxims of the Law, Regula 1.
26
Marble
27

vs. Worcester, 4 Gray (Mass.) 395, 406 (1855).
See, e. g., Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. vs. Nitsche, 126 Ind. 229,
238 (1890); Bigelow on Torts (7th Ed.), sec. 98; 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, p. 122.
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At an early day23 there prevailed another test of the existence of causal relation known as the "But for Rule,"
which affirmed that the defendant's tort is the legal cause of
plaintiff's damage if, but for the commission of defendant's
tort, the damage would not have happened. This statement in negative form could generally be applied as a test
of what is not the cause of an event, for, if the damage
would have occurred without defendant's tort, the defendant is not liable. The "but for" requirement is indispensable in determining whether a given antecedent is a
cause at all. But finding that defendant's wrongdoing was
a cause is not necessarily a determination that it was the
legal cause. A given event would not occur but for all of
its antecedents, and every antecedent cannot be the legal
cause. This test or rule has been universally rejected, and
is admittedly inadequate to be used as a guide in all cases
29
to determine legal cause.
There is another alleged rule known as the "Last Human Wrongdoer Rule," 30 which is, in substance, as fol282 Pollock & Maitland, History of the Common Law (2d
Ed.), 470.
29Gilman vs. Noyes, 57 N. H. 627 (1876), is most frequently
cited in connection with the "but for rule." The lower court instructed the jury that "if the plaintiff's sheep escaped in consequence of the bars being left down by the defendant, and would

not have been killed by bears, but for the act of the defendant,"
he was liable. The upper court reversed the judgment below on
the ground that the destruction by bears was unforeseeable.
Judge Ladd, dissenting, urged that the defendant should be held
liable. He seems to have thought the application of the "but for
rule" was not unjust, but admitted that the rule could not be
universally applied as the sole test for determining legal cause.
3
0In Clifford vs. Atlantic Cotton Mills, 146 Mass. 47 (1888),
Mr. Justice Holmes said "the general tendency has been to look

no further back than the last wrongdoer." See for an application of the rule, unjust to plaintiff, in Wood vs. Pa. R. R. Co., 177
Pa. 306, 310 (1896). Dr. Wharton is a vigorous advocate of this
rule. See Wharton, Negligence (1st Ed.), appendix, bottom paging 823, et seq., also in text, sees. 85-99, and sees. 134-145. Vicars
vs. Wilcocks, 8 East (Eng.), 1 (1806), is also frequent authority
for the rule.
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lows: the legal cause is the last (or nearest) culpable human
actor to be found in the chain of antecedents; i. e., the one
acting last before, or nearest to, the happening of the damage to the plaintiff. This rule is easy and mechanical in its
application. It is only necessary to trace back the links in
the chain of antecedents and pick out the wrongful act of a
free human agent nearest the plaintiff's damage. The rule
is a good one to use in a hurry, but it is hardly discriminating enough to decide liability in all cases, for sometimes the
act of the last human wrongdoer is so remote as to have
entirely spent its force before the happening of the damage,
and, therefore, cannot be the legal cause. 3 At other times
a wrongdoer, prior to the last in chronological order, may
also be held liable at the election of the plaintiff.32 If such
person's act is held to be a legal cause, it is not because he
was the last human wrongdoer. Again, when the damage
results from the simultaneous concurrent acts of two independent wrongdoers, neither could escape liability on the
3
ground that he was not the last human wrongdoer. 3
Continued in February Issue
FRED S. REESE
(N. B.-This article reprinted by permission of The Cornell
Law Quarterly.)
319 H. L. R. 84-85; B. & 0. R. R. Co. vs. School District, 96
Pa. 65
(1880); Laidlaw vs. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73 (1899).
3
2See, e. g., Lane vs. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136 (1872);
Wallace vs. P. R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 556 (1909); Williams vs. Koehler Co., 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 426 (1899).
33W. & G. R. R. Co. vs. Hiekey, 166 U. S. 521 (1897); Burrell Township vs. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353 (1887); Sheridan vs. R.
R. 36 N. Y. 39 (1867).
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MOOT COURT
BRANDT vs. SEMPEL
Assignment of Mortgage-Constructive Trust-Disposition of
Personal Estate-Rights of Wife
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Brandt, owning a mortgage of $8,000, assigned it in writing
to the defendant, his daughter. Five years later, he prays this
bill in Equity to have Sempel declared, a trustee for him, and to
compel her to reassign the mortgage. Proof is that the assignment was made with the intention that the assignee should hold
the mortgage until requested to reassign it, and that the request
has been refused. The defense is that: (1) The assignment was
an absolute gift, if not it was made as a result of temporary
estrangement of Brandt, from his wife. The plaintiff seeks to
have Sempel declared a trustee on the ground that a constructive
trust existed.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FORTNEY, J.-This is a bill in Equity to have Sempel declared a trustee for Brandt. The facts are not in dispute.
When Brandt assigned the mortgage to his daughter presumably he made her a gift of the same. A parent may make a gift
to his child and it will not be presumed to be invalid unless a confidential relationship existed between them.-42 Pacific 343, 30
L. R. A. 243.
After a lapse of five years he now endeavors to have this
assignment declared a trust and his daughter a trustee. The
question now is therefore raised whether upon the facts set forth
any intent appears to warrant the proceedings on the part of
Brandt to compel Sempel to be held as a trustee.
It is plainly evident that this is not the case of an express
trust, contained in the instrument or acknowledged by the acts
of the trustee. The assignment by Brandt to Sempel carried with
it entire ownership leaving in Brandt no apparent legal title or
equitable interest. It was evidence of a gift not of a trust reposed in Sempel and accepted by her. This so remained for five
years without any assertion of a trust (without) by Sempel, or
even a recognition of it by Brandt. Technically continuing
trusts and constructive trusts will not be enforced by Equity un-
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der the circumstances. Evidence has been offered that the motive
for the assignment of this mortgage was a most ignoble one,
namely a temporary estrangement from his wife. The Court of
Equity is primarily a Court of Conscience functioning on certain
maxims among them this one. He who comes into Equity must
come with clean hands. It is our opinion that the plaintiff's hands
were unclean. When one attempts to hide the title of his property-during a period of temporary estrangement from his wifein his daughter thereby attempting to defraud the said wife of
the property justly due her, Equity will not when the trick has
served its purpose search out the property from its hiding place
and return it to him on a silver platter in the form of a judicial
declaration of a trust in his favor. It will rather like the Judges
of old take water and wash its hands in token of its innocense of
the terrible thing about to happen.
The Bill is accordingly Dismissed.
The following authorities are cited by the Court: Lyon vs.
Marclay-1 Watts 271; Finney vs. Cochran-1 Watts 118; Halsey vs. Tate-52 Pa. 311; Dalzell vs. Lewis-252 Pa. 287.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The mortgage was personalty. It could be assigned orally.
It was, however, assigned in writing. It might have been assigned
to become the absolute property of the daughter, SempeL It
might have been assigned to be held by her for the benefit of the
assignor, Brandt, and to be reassigned on his demand. That this
was the purpose manifested to Sempel, and assented to by her,
could be proved by parol evidence. It was in fact so proved. It
follows that Sempel, refusing to perform the act of reassignment,'
can be compelled to do so by a Court of Equity unless some obstacle presents itself.
The defense that the mortgage was a gift is refuted by the
evidence. That it was assigned otherwise than as a gift is the
"proof."
The other defense is that its making was a species of fraud
upon Brandt's wife, from whom, for the time, he was estranged.
But there is no substance in this charge. A wife has, during the
husband's life, no estate in, no lien upon, his personal property.
He may waste it is unprofitable and absurd speculation. He may
give it outright to others, knowing and intending that his wife
shall thus be rendered incapable of ever sharing in it. "It is the
settled law of this state," said PAXSON, J., "that a man may do
what he pleases with his personal estate during his life. He may
even beggar himself and his family [including his wife] if he
chooses to commit such an act of folly. When he dies, and then

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

only, does the right of his wife attach to his personal estate."
Lines vs. Lines-142 Pa. 149; Ellmaker vs. Ellmaker-4 W 91;
Mandel vs. Bron-113 Atl. Rep., (July 7th, 1921), p. 834.
Brandt did not divest himself of the mortgage. He retained an equitable interest in it, which would have been as useful to his wife as the legal interest. The purpose of the bill is, if
an injury was done to the wife by the assignment, to undo the
wrong, by enforcing the trust.
We are obliged, then, to come to a result different from that
reached by the learned court below. The decree dismissing the
bill is reversed, with a procedendo.
BOROUGH OF CARLISLE vs. PHILLIPS
Action for Personal Injuries-Negligence--Liability of Municipal
Corporation-Liability of Property Holder
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ice and snow accumulated on the sidewalk in front of
Phillips' home throughout a whole month. X, a pedestrian, in attempting to traverse the pavement, fell and his leg was broken.
He sued Carlisle and recovered $600 damages. The borough notified Phillips and allowed him to intervene at the trial. He did
not deny the liability of the borough.
In this suit by the borough it contends: (a) That the judgment against it is conclusive of its liability to pay the $600; (b)
That Phillips was liable to pedestrians for not cleaning the paveoment of ice and snow; (c) That he is bound to pay the $600 to it.
Gallagher for the Plaintiff.
Bloom for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GARBER, J.-Phillips, the defendant in the case at bar, allowed snow and ice to accumulate on his sidewalk throughout a
whole month. X slipped, fell, and was injured. He sued the Borough of Carlisle and recovered $600 damages. Phillips had intervened in the trial for the protection of his interests. In this case
the Borough of Carlisle seeks reimbursement for the damages
it has had to pay X under the decree of the court in X vs. Borough of Carlisle.
The case of X vs. Borough of Carlisle concludes Phillips in
this action as to the existence of the defect, the liability of the
borough to X in consequence thereof, and as to the amount of
damages the injury had occasioned. Phillips is not stopped from
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showing that he was not under any obligation to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition. Brookville Borough vs. Arthurs-152
Pa. 334; Reading City vs. Reiner-167 Pa. 41.
The able counsel for the defendant advances the legal proposition that an abutting owner is not liable to one injured on a
sidewalk from failure to keep the same in repair or free from ice
and snow. In support of this proposition cases from a number
of States are cited. We are directed to no Pennsylvania cases.
In Pennsylvania it is the primary duty of property owners along a
street to keep in proper repair the sidewalk in front of their respective properties. Mintzer vs. Hogg-192 Pa. 137; Reading
City vs. Reiner-167 Pa. 41. There is also a duty upon a municipality to exercise a reasonable supervision over its sidewalk.
Duncan vs. City of Philadelphia-173-Pa. 55; Yohn vs. Phillipsburg Borough-156 Pa. 246. Therefore one who sustains injuries from an accident caused by a defective sidewalk may have
two sources of recovery. The first is the owner of the abutting
property, who is liable for his neglect to keep the sidewalk in a
safe condition. The second is the borough, the liability of which
arises from its negligent failure to compel the property owner tD
keep his sidewalk in repair. Brookville vs. Arthurs--152 Pa. 334.
Phillips was primarily liable to X, because he was negligent
in the case of his sidewalk. The Borough of Carlisle was accordingly liable to X because it was negligent in the exercise
of its duty of supervision. The Borough of Carlisle has been
compelled to pay X $600 damages. Phillips' negligence in the
case of his sidewalk was the real or proximate cause of the accident to X. Therefore he must reimburse the Borough of Carlisle. Brookville Borough vs. Arthurs-152 Pa. 334.
Judgment entered for Plaintiff for $600. Reading City vs.
Reiner-167 Pa. 41; Pittsburgh vs. Reed-74 Pa. Sup Ct. 44.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
It was the duty of Phillips to keep his pavement safe for pedestrians. For not doing it, the person injured by his neglect
could recover compensation from him.
The borough had also a liability, not exactly like that of
Phillips. According to the letter of Lehr vs. Phillipsburg-156
Pa. 246, its duty was not to make the repair, but to "compel the
owner" to make it. The accuracy of this may be questioned. We
prefer to say that it was the duty of the borough, not to compel
the owner to make it, but to make it, after a certain neglect
of the owner, with a right to recoupment from him, of the
expense.

DICKINSON LAw REVIEW

In this case, the borough did not remove the ice and snow, at
a time when it should have done so, and therefore at a time
somewhat later than that at which Phillips should have done so.
A judgment for $600 has been recovered against it. The propriety of this judgment cannot be contested by Phillips, for he
was allowed to participate in the defense. The borough's liability was for not correcting the defect which Phillips should
have corrected. It has a right to be indemnified by Phillips for
what it has been compelled to pay in reparation of an injury
caused by his omission to perform his duty.
The opinion of the learned trial court amply justifies its decision. Pittsburgh vs. Reed-74 Supr. 444.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

TOLAND'S ESTATE
Executor's Sale--Confirmation-Rescission---Orphans'

Court

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The executors of Toland have, authorized by Orphans'
He has
Court, sold the land to Hammond for $3000.
paid $750. The sale is reported to the court and confirmed.
Hammond fails to pay the rest of the price according to the contract. The executors ask the court to annul its confirmation, and
to authorize a resale. The court so orders, but makes no provision for the repayment of the"$750. Hammond argues that the
sale to him having been rescinded, he is entitled to a return of
the $750.
Polisher for the Petitioner.
Wilks-Contra.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHAPIRO, J.-Petition to vacate and set aside an order of
sale and to authorize a resale.
The executors present this petition praying the court to
make an order vacating the former confirmation due to the failure
of the first purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Hammond, the first purchaser, opposes this petition on the
ground that no provision is made as to the return of $750, hand
money paid by him; and contends that if the former confirmation
is vacated and a resale ordered, it is in effect rescinding the
former sale to him and consequently relieving him from all liability. The questions therefore presented for the determination
of the court are as follows:

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Must the Orphans' Court on vacating and setting aside
(1)
a confirmation of a sale of real estate and ordering a resale, due
to the neglect of the purchaser to pay the balance of the purchase price, decree the return to the said purchaser of the hand
money he paid?
(2) Is such an order the equivalent to the rescinding the
contract of sale?
Both of these questions must be answered in the negative.
Presupposing for the time being that the sale was one in
which the Orphans' Court had no jurisdiction, what would be the
effect of Hammond's neglect to pay? If X would enter into a
valid and binding contract for the sale of real estate with Hammond, and then Hammond, after paying him some hand money
would refuse to pay the balance of the purchase price, could
Hammond demand a return of the hand money? Clearly not,
until X's loss would have been determined and ascertained.
It is settled that where one has entered into an agreement to
purchase land and makes default, the vendor may subsequently
sell the property, after proper notice, upon the same or as advantageous terms as of the first sale, and if there is a loss he may
recover such a loss from him who made the default under the
earlier contract. Brown vs. Cessna-62 Pa. 148; Pepper vs.
Deakefne-212 Pa. 181.
The only limitation to the above rule is that the terms of
the first sale must not be more advantageous than that of the second sale, nor must it appear that a more valuable title could have
been acquired by the purchaser of the first sale than that which
passed to the purchaser at the last sale.
There is no difference in effect of a sale made by an executor with the approval of the Orphans' Court, than there is in
a sale made by one in his own individual capacity. The sanction
of the Orphans' Court gives the purchaser no greater rights, and
the vacating of an order of sale and ordering a resale, should
not give the purchaser at the first sale rights which he cannot assert against the vendor, when not acting under the supervision
of the Orphans' Court.
After the confirmation of the sale and failure on the part of
the purchaser to comply with the conditions, the executor had
two courses to pursue-either to compel the payment of the balance by an action at law, or to have the confirmation of the sale
set aside and proceed to re-sell the property. Having adopted
the latter method, as unquestionably he had a right to do, then he
has a right to hold the $750 and out of it, reimburse the estate to
the amount of damages actually sustained by Hammond's failure
to execute the contract. The order of the Orphans' Court did not
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have the effect of rescinding the contract and relieving the purchaser from liability for the difference between his bid and the
price for which the property might subsequently be sold. Banes
vs. Gordon-9 Pa. 428; Ludwig's Estate-74 Super. 250.
It is therefore ordered and decreed that the order ratifying
the sale of real estate of the above nauhed decedent to Hammond
is hereby vacated and set aside, and it is further ordered and decreed by and is hereby awarded, the executor to hold the $750 so
far paid in by Hammond so as to adjust any loss which might occur at the second sale.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Hammond, after paying $750 on his purchase, has failed to
complete the payment of the remainder of the $3,000. The Orphans' Court has annulled the confirmation of the sale, thus removing an obstacle to a resale by the executor. The Hammond
contract still continues. The executor has the right to resell, and
if he does, and for a less price than the $3,000, he will have the
right to retain all or some of the $750. He must be allowed to
retain that sum in order that the results of a resale may be realized. The learned court below has properly found in Ludwig's
Estate-74 Pa. 25 0., authority for its decision.
The appeal is dismissed.

WHIPPLE vs. RAILROAD CO.
Negligence-Proximate Cause-Evidence

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff owned land on both sides of a road forty feet
wide. On the east of this road was the track of the defendant.
On the other side was a field at one point in which was a barn,
which was 400 feet from the railroad.
Shortly after a train passed in the afternoon of an August
day, a fire was seen at several places in the field, contiguous to
the track. This was put out, but immediately thereafter a fire
was discovered upon the barn.
Nobody saw sparks from the locomotive. In this suit, for
the destruction of the barn, the defendant alleges: (a) Not sufficient evidence that the locomotive caused the fire; (b) The fire
in the barn was not the pfoximate effect.
Scheufele for the Plaintiff.
Smith for the Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
SCHNEE, J.-There was no affirmative evidence that the
fire from the field was communicated to the barn. All that appears is that shortly after a train passed, in the afternoon of an
August day, a fire was discovered at several places in a field,
contiguous to the tracks.
Bearing in mind the short interval of time which elapsed between the passing of the train and the appearances of the fire at
several places in the field it is reasonable to presume that the
fires in the field, were caused by the passing engine. Henderson
et al vs. Phila. Elec. R. R. Co.-144 Pa. 461. So was held that:
"In view of the circumstances of the case, the loss by fire, was
fairly attributed to sparks from the railroad company's engine or
the locomotive."
We cannot therefore sustain the defendant's first objection,
viz: That there was not sufficient evidence that the locomotive
caused the fire.
The court will now consider objection B of the defendant
which is-the fire in the barn was not the proximate effect.
't
With the proposition that the engine's sparks fired the grass
continguous to the tracks, as first presumed, can it not be also presumed that the fire in the barn was communicated by the fires in
the grass?
The Supreme Court of the Dickinson School of Law has held
that a presumption can be based on a presumption. Just as reasonable and logical as this rule is, yet the courts in Pennsylvania
have always held, thit a presumption cannot be based on a presumption, but must always be based on a fact, and such presumption should be a reasonable and natural deduction from that
fact. Railway vs. Henrice-92 Pa. 431; Welch vs. The R. R. Co.
-181 Pa. 461.
Since it can be presumed that, in view of the authorities
cited, that sparks from the passing engine, fired the grass contiguous to the track, it can also be presumed that other sparks
of the engine, also fell upon the barn, thereby igniting it. However, the plaintiff does not contend this to be the case, and it is
not within the province of the court, to find or hold, what the
plaintiff has failed to allege.
Instead of contending that the sparks from the engine directly caused the firing of the barn, the plaintiff contends that the
engine's sparks first caused fire to the field, and the field in turn,
caused fire to the barn, by sparks that came from the field, across
the road, to the barn.
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In our opinion, this is entirely too remote, and we must hold
that the fire in the barn, was not the proximate effect, thus upholding contention B of the defendant.
In conclusion we cite Bartolet vs. McAdoo, Director General
of R. R's.-74 Superior 29, a case which is exactly on point with
the case at bar.
Judgment for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Let us suppose that it was clear that sparks from the defendant s engine directly and proximately caused the' burning of
the plaintiff's barn. The defendant would not be liable unless the
escape of the sparks that caused the fire was the result of its
negligence. But sparks of any size may have caused the fire;
sparks so small that the most improved spark arrester could not
have prevented their escape. From the size of the escaping sparks
an inference may be drawn as to the quality of the spark arrester, but this case is devoid of all evidence on that subject. So
far as we know, the tiniest sparks, passing the best spark arrester, may have caused the fire. Since then the fire may have
been caused, with as well as without, a poor spark arrester, we
cannot infer that the arrester was unfit.
That the fire was caused by the sparks, we think a jury
might legitimately infer. Shortly after the passing of the train,
several fires were seen in the field, and on the barn. Such a fire
is explicable by the hypothesis that sparks from the locomotive
caused it. There was no other supposable cause.
Unnecessary trouble has been taken, with respect to the
proximity of the fire on the barn, to the emitted sparks. The
evidence is not that a spark from the field caused the barn to
burn. Immediately after the putting out of the fires in the field,
fire was seen on the barn; but that is not equivalent to saying that
the barn fire was caused by a spark not from the engine, but from
the field. Many sparks were emitted, several falling on the field
at different parts. One or more, may have fallen on the barn.
The fact that the discovery of the barn fire was later, by a brief
space, than the discovery of the field fire, does not warrant the
inference that it was caused later than the field fire; nor if it did,
that the spark causing it, emanated from the field, and not the
stack.
If we might infer that the barn fire was caused by the field
fire, it would not follow that the former was not sufficiently near
to the emission of sparks from the engine to make the defendant
liable. A fire falls on a door step. The ignited step ignites the
near wood. This ignites the remoter and this the still remoter, un-
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til the whole building is destroyed. It would be foolish to say
that the fire which caused the ignition of the step, did not cause,
sufficiently nearly to be compensable, the ignition of the house.
Cf. Pa. R. R. vs. Hope, 80 Pa. 373, 24 Dickinson Law Review 18.
Had there been adequate evidence that the escape of the
noxious sparks was caused by the defendant's negligence, there
should, we think, have been a verdict and a judgment for the
plaintiff. In the absence of that evidence, it was proper to enter
judgment for the defendant.
AFFIRMED.
JACKSON'S ESTATE
Validity of Marriage--Dower
STATEMENT OF FACTS '
John Jackson married in Idaho deserted his wife and came to
Pennsylvania. Here he married to Sarah, the claimant. They
lived together as husband and wife. Four years after the marriage the legal wife died in Idaho. Jackson and Sarah continued
as before to live together, and to recognize each other as husband
and wife. Their friends and neighbors regarded them as such.
Sarah claims a widow's share of Jackson's estate.
Delesantro for the Plaintiff.
Dively for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DOUGLAS, J.-The question for consideration is, whether
after the death of Jackson's wife in Idaho he became married to
Sarah?
Prior to the death there could have been no marriage but, because of the well established rule that death of one party to a contract revokes the contract it is possible that there could have been
a common law marriage. However, it is well to make obsolete this
common law rule in every feasible instance to comply with the
intention of the legislature.
They have passed statutes setting forth the necessary requisites for marriage such as, procuring a license, obtaining the consent of the parents and .the formalities, so as, there will be conclusive evidence of the marriage. In 'the case at bar none of these requisites were complied with. Nor it is alleged that words in the
present or future tense were used, but they attempt to prove the
allegation of marriage wholly upon cohabitation and reputation.
There is nothing to indicate an intention of marriage, other than
the speaking of each other as husband and wife. To permit the
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marriage by cohabitation and reputation is only allowing persons
to evade the law as made by the legislature. For instance persons who were refused a license for some reason can live together
So far as can be learned this common law rule is upheld in
but two instances that is, to permit a legal conveyance and to
avoid illegitimate children. Neither of these exceptions are present.
More than this, it is well founded that cohabitation and reputation was illicit for a period of four years. Upon this the
Pennsylvania Courts have numerious times repeated that, "where
the relation of a man and woman living together, is illicit in its
commencement it is presumed to continue as such until a changed
relation is proved; without proof of a subsequent actual marriage it will not be presumed from cohabitation and reputation,
of a relation between them which was of illicit origin. 20 C. C.
577; 113 Pa. 208. 131 Pa. 202; 237 Pa. 24; 250 Pa. 78; 266 Pa.
530; 10 Supr. 127; 17 Supr. 546.
Here the case establishes with sufficient certainty that in its
inception the relation between Jackson and Sarah was illicit, and
that there is not sufficient evidence to presume a subsequent marriage. Nor is there sufficient evidence to satisfy the mind that
there was an agreement to form the relation of husband and wife,
and that there was not a marriage between the death of the Idaho
wife, and to be regarded by friends and neighbors as such.
Since Sarah cannot establish her claim as widow she has no
right to participate in the distribution of the estate of decedent.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Jackson's marriage to Sarah was invalid because he had already been married in Idaho, and had not been divorced. But
Sarah and he underwent the ceremony of a marriage, and have
lived together as man and wife. The legal wife died, and they
continued to live together; to recognize each other as man and
wife, and to be regarded by friends and neighbors as such.
That the relation was originally illicit is no obstacle to its
becoming lawful. The parties intended to be man and wife at a
time when they could legally have been such. They virtually
contracted, then, to be such. They had the reputation of being
such by friends and neighbors.
Harmonizing all dicta and decisions on the subject is not
possible. Nor is it necessary. Nor would it be profitable to accomplish it, were it possible.
We prefer the mode of thought indicated in Thewliss' Estate
-217 Pa. 307, and Knecht vs. Knecht-261 Pa. 410, and conclude that the evidence is ample to show a contractual purpose to
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be husband and wife, after all legal obstacles to the marriage
contract had been removed. Hence we think Sarah is entitled to
a widow's share in Jackson's estate.
The decree of the learned court below is
REVERSED.
FRAME vs. HAPGOOD
Trespass-Negligence--Master and Servant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hapgood's employee ran an automobile of Hapgood at his
direction, but after finishing the task set him, decided to go to
a point four miles distant, for an object of his own, and in doing
so negligently ran into Frame's vehicle, damaging it and Frame
himself. This is an action for damages against Hapgood. The
evidence left doubtful whether he had consented to the employee's using the automobile for his own purpose.
Surran for the Plaintiff.
Stone for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
STEVENS, J.-This is an action for damages brought by
one Frame who was injured by reason of the negligent driving
of an automobile by an alleged employee of the defendant. It
appears from the evidence submitted that the employee, at the
time the assault was committed, was engaged in the performance
of an act, solely for the employee's own benefit and solely for his
own purpose. Whether or not the master, Hapgood, consented to
the performance of the act is left doubtful.
That the master is liable for the act of his servant while he
is engaged in the masters business, and that the burden of proving the relationship of master and servant is generally upon the
party alleging it, consequently upon the plaintiff in this case, can
admit of no argument.
Under the particular circumstances of the case at bar, in order for the plaintiff to recover, it is incumbent upon him to show
by a fair preponderance of evidence that the true relationship of
master and servant was then existing, at the time of the infliction of the injury. The whole question is built around this primary relationship, and we will proceed to consider it.
We think that there can be no presumption that the relationship continued by reason of the fact that some time preceeding the accident there was existing such a relationship. Because
I am a servant today is no reason to suppose I will occupy that
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position tomorrow, next week, or a year from now. If there is
no continuing relationship, and we think there can be no presumption of one, the plaintiff must show that at the time the tortious
act was committed, the servant was engaged in the masters business. Scheel vs. Shaw-60 Superior 73; 252 Pa. 451.
Another point relied upon is that if the master consented to
the using of the machine, he virtually ratified the acts of the
servant and is liable therefor. We think the question of monsent
is immaterial. Even if he did consent, it amounted to no more
than the owner's lending the car.
The weight of authority clearly is in favor of exempting automobile owners from liability for damages caused by a collision due
to the negligence of an employee, while the employee is using the
machine for a purpose of his own, whether the owner knew that
the car was being so used or not. Beatty vs. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co.-263 Pa. 271, and cases therein cited.
In order to hold the owner of an automobile liable for the
negligence of his chauffeur, it is incumbent to show by direct or
circumstantial evidence not only that the driver was the servant
of the defendant, but that he was on the defendant's errand or
engaged in his business at the time of the accident. Solomon vs.
Commonwealth Trust Co., of Pittsburgh-256 Pa. 55.
The cases on this point are numerous. Lotz vs. Hanlon217 Pa. 339; Scheel vs. Shaw-Supra; Doran vs. Thomsen-76 N.
J. L. 754; Cronecker vs. Hall, N. J. Errors and Appeals-1918,
105 Atl. 213; Eldredge et al vs. Calhoun N. J. Errors and Appears-1920, 112 Atl. 340.
The vicarious responsibility of a master is legally predicated
upon the presumed or proved existence of the relationship of master and servant. If the relationship cannot be shown to have existed at the time of the occurrence of the damage complained of,
responsibility does not exist and the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot operate.
On the whole we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has
failed to show a very material part of his cause. He has failed to
make out a case and the verdict must be for the defendant. It is
hereby ordered that a verdict be given for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The defendant is not liable because the instrument of the injury was his automobile. A might use B's property in inflicting
an injury on C, and B would not be liable.
Nor would the owner be liable because he consented to the
use of the automobile by X for X's purposes. If he were liable,
it would be necessary for the plaintiff to establish this consent.
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This he has not done. "The evidence left doubtful whether he
had consented to the employee's using the automobile for his own
purposes. '
Hapgood can be liable only if the chauffeur was acting for
him when the negligent act occurred. He had "finished the task
set him." He went four miles further for "an object of his own."
At this time he had suspended the relation of master and servant,
and his act could not, except with gross injustice, be attributed to
Hapgood. The doctrine of "respondeat superior" often works
great hardship. Nothing justifies it except the consideration that
the injury has occurred in the prosecution of the aims and purposes of the principal. It would be a serious perversion of the
principle to apply it to cases in which the injury is not an incident in the promotion of the master's aims.
Sheel vs. Shaw-252 Pa. 451, and Beatty vs. Tire and Rubber Co.-263 Pa. 271, and numerous other decisions sufficiently
support the decision of the learned court below, and its decision
is
AFFIRMED.
SLOAN vs. McCOY
Conditional Sale-Contracts--Suit by Third Party
STATEMENT OF FACTS
McCoy leased certain machinery to X, with the right of becoming owner on the payment of certain installments. He agreed
with X that if X made default in payment, Sloan should be notified and have the option of taking X's place. X made default
but Sloan was not notified nor permitted to complete X's payments, and to become the owner. Sloan sues in Assumpsit for
breach of this contract, and recovers the value of the machinery
minus the money still unpaid on the lease, which X had undertaken to pay.
Doehne for the Plaintiff.
Duall for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DOYLE, J.-The Defendant, Appellant in this case, contends
that the Court below erred in permitting Sloan to maintain an action in his own name against him, claiming that as Sloan was not
a party to the contract, he should not have been permitted to
bring the action in his own name.
In support of this contention the Appellant cited Elliot on
Contracts, par. 1411, "No one can sue on a contract to which he is
not a party."
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Our interpretation of the above quotation from Elliott is
that it was used by the author mostly to state what the old Common Law used to be in England. For in the very next paragraph
(Par. 1412) it is stated by Elliot that at the present time a great
majority of the courts in the United States uphold the doctrine
"That a third person who is a beneficiary of though not a party
to a contract, may maintain an action directly in his own name
against the promisor, when such promise between the promisor
and promisee is supported by a sufficient consideration and was
made for the benefit of such third party."
We think the case before us should be decided according to
this doctrine. For there is no doubt in our mind that there existed
a valid binding contract between X and McCoy, which was supported by consideration, and that according to the terms of this
contract Sloan although not a party to it was nevertheless a beneficiary. For it was specificially agreed that if X should default,
then his interest was to pass to Sloan.
It seems a fair and reasonable interpretation of the contract
that when X defaulted, his interest in the lease passed to Sloan,
and that Sloan ought to be allowed to enforce his rights against
McCoy.
The cases cited by the Defendant, in our opinion, do not
justify his contention, but on the contrary they all illustrate the
principle stated in Paragraph 1412 of Elliot on Contracts; and
as before stated we think this doctrine should be applied in the
present case. We also consider the case, (Depuy vs. Loamis-74
Pa. Sup. 497), cited by the able attorney for the Plaintiff, to be
directly on point and in accord with the principle of law set
forth in Par. 1412 of Elliot on Contracts. In Depuy vs. Loamis,
supra., it was held that a beneficiary third party to a contract
similar to the one in the case at bar, could bring action in his own
name.
For the reasons given above the judgment of the learned
court below is
AFFIRMED.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
That only the party to a contract may enforce it against the
other party is a general principle. There are well recognized exceptions to it, some of which are enumerated in Adams Kuehn118 Pa. 76; Edmundson's Estate-259 Pa. 49. A may make a
cont-act that something be done by B for the benefit of C. C is
the only person who will be benefitted by the performance.
Nevertheless, A has a right to nominal damages because his contract has been broken. Nevertheless, since real and substantial

DICKINSON LAw REVIEW

damages are suffered by C only, they can be sued for and recovered by C. He may enforce a right which he did not purchase,
but which A bought for him.
Here the lease of machinery was made to X with right to become the owner upon payment of certain sums of money. But if
X made default, Sloan was to have the right to complete the payments, and become the owner. McCoy, ignoring the right of Sloan
to become the owner, is retaining the machinery. Sloan may enforce the contract, though not a party to it.
He is enforcing the contract not specifically by replevin, but
by a suit for damages. The damages are the value of the machinery less the amount of money that Sloan would have to pay
under the contract to perfect his right to it. He has recovered
those damages. Depuy vs. Loamis-74 Supr. 497, is sufficient
authority.
The judgment of the learned court below is
AFFIRMED.
McKINLEY'S ESTATE
Wills-Bar to Claim
STATEMENT OF FACTS
His will directed that though he had been indebted to some
of his children his debts had been paid, and that no 'child who
claimed against his estate on an alleged debt, should share in his
estate as legatee. He then directed his estate to be equally divided among the children that refrain from claiming as creditors.
His son, John, having a note for $400 of his father's, presented
it for payment before the auditor who was making distribution.
The note's genuiness being undisputed and no evidence of payment appearing save the testamentary declaration of the decedent payment was allowed. John also claimed along with his
three brothers an equal share of the estate. The auditor has
allowed his claim. The residue for distribution is $4000. To
John is awarded $1000.
Fox for. the Plaintiff.
Stevens for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DURNIN, J.-The only question to be decided in this ease
is: Whether the son of the testator who has claimed and been
paid $400 on a note of his father's, can share in the residue of
the estate contrary to the provisions of his father's will?
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The will was certainly a valid one. Hence it is needless for
us to dwell on that phase of the case. By claiming on the note,
John was virtually electing to take against the will, since its very
provisions directed, that no child who claimed against his estate
on an alleged debt should share in his estate as legatee. Unfortunately, John claimed against the estate thereby removing himself from the position of legatee to the class of a creditor. However, his foolishness is not for us to lament.
The testator evidently had no rational motive nor malice toward his son in his so willing. Even if he had had the will would
stand due to its clear and unambiguous terms. It is the testator's right and privilege to dispose of his propbrty as he sees fit,
so long as he complies with the law. The terms of the will admit
the testator had at some time or other been indebted to his children. Such is the case in life with most father and children. But
the methods employed in such dealings are usually of a different
nature from those of debtor and creditor.
The law as laid down in Friend's Estate-209 Pa. 442; that
a provision in a will declaring the forfeiture of a legacy if the
legatee contests the validity of the will is valid, and to go further, as held in 5 Dist. Reports 739, Wesco's Appeal-52 Pa. 195;
Homer vs. McGaughey-62 Pa. 189, a legacy in a will is presumed to be payment of a debt.
The basic ground for our decision is to be found in Berlin's
Estate-74 Superior 455. This is a most recent case and holds:
That a provision in a will declaring the forfeiture of a legacy in
case the legatee, a child of the testator, shall present a claim
against his estate, is valid and does not violate -nv rule of law
or public policy. Such a condition is lawful and one which the
testator had a right to annex, in the disposition of his property.
The testator has indicated his belief he has been discharged
of all indebtedness. The will was clear and concise on that point
and under its terms John can show no title in himself to the legacy
he claims.
Judgment for the Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The court below has properly decided that the son, John, has
lost the right to claim as legatee by having claimed payment on
the $400 note. The $4000 is divisible between the three brothers,
each receiving $1,333.33.
The appeal is dismissed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Handbook of the Law of Trusts, by George Gleason Bogert,
Professor of Law in the Cornell University College of Law. The
Hornbook Series. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1921 Pp. XIII.,
675.
This book has no competitors. There is no other textbook
which purports "to give to practitioners and students a compact
summary of the fundamental principles of the American law relating to trusteeships."
Indeed, in view of its importance, the
subject of trusts has been very inadequately treated by text
writers.
American law is pervaded on every hand by the idea of relation and of the legal consequences flowing therefrom. The original type of relation was the feudal relation of lord and man.
This furnished the analogy for other relations, and suggested the
juristic conception of rights, duties, and liabilities arising,, not
from express undertaking, the terms of any transaction, voluntary wrongdoing or culpable action, but simply and solely as incidents of a relation, and this conception as applied by courts of
equity, has resulted in a great category of fiduciary relations, of
which trustee and beneficiary is the type.
A text book which treats this relation-the largest and most
difficult of equity-with thoroughness and accuracy was much
needed, and Professor Bogert's book admirably supplies the need.
Commendable features of the book are: The use which it
makes of articles in leading law periodicals;the proportion observed in treating of the history of the law and the law itself;
the discussion of the powers and duties of a trustee and of the
remedies of the cestui; its treatment of savings bank trust; and
its excellent analysis of the nature of the cestui's rights.
The book has some shortcomings due doubtless to its brevity,
but its general excellence is such as to render it a necessary part
of the office equipment of every lawyer who is called upon to
solve questions of law arising out of the relation of trustee and
beneficiary.

Cases on the Law of Domestic Relations and Persons, by Edwin H.
Woodruff. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1920.
This compilation of cases, has been made by the recent dean of the
College of Law of Cornell University. The book contains 753 pages.
Particular attention is limited to the fact that the book is of such a size as
will make it practicable to cover its contents in the time usually allotted
to the subject. The book is distributed into parts, viz: Marriage, Parent and Child, Infancy, Insanity, Drunkenness, Aliens. Appendix I treats
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of common law marriages in the United States, and Appendix 11 gives the
draft of the proposed uniform divorce act. Apropos of this last, it may be
questioned why, save for the benefit of lawyers, the effort should be made
to unify the law in the several states on so many topics not embraced in
those mentioned in the federal constitution. If it is really desirable to
have the same law in all the states on negotiable paper, warehouse receipts, divorce, etc., etc., why is not an effort made to enlarge the powers
of Congress so as to embrace these topics?
An examination of Prof. Woodruff's book has convinced us of its
very great utility. The cases have been well selected, and not a few very
instructive notes have been inserted. The book will be found extremely
valuable for use in law schools.

